Style, Sorcery, Alienation

By John M. Heaton

Ronnie (RD Laing) meant many things to many people. I will elaborate on some aspects of his thought and practice as I knew them.

**Style.** What struck me on first meeting Ronnie was his style, he stood out from most people because of his unique style or way of being. This was not merely a matter of the way he dressed, the music he liked, his conversation, his looks, and his rather dry and sometimes cruel humour; but his style conveyed something of great importance which can only be conveyed by style. This was crucial in his psychotherapy and one of the things he can teach us is the vitality of style in the practice of psychotherapy and counselling.

Style conveys something above and beyond what can be explicitly said by means of interpretation and other interventions. For what there is to understand in being human is richer than what it becomes when put into the jargon of therapeutic speech. Intelligibility depends on dialogue, on the way things are said and to whom; there is more to dialogue than what is said.

Style is not just an aesthetic matter. We must distinguish style from stylish; the latter is a matter of aesthetics. A stylish person is consciously concerned about their appearance and tends to conform to the latest fashion. Style on the other hand is unconscious; we all have a style, a way of being that is visible to others; and this is what Foucault (1988: p.6) called ethics, or the practice of freedom as opposed to morality. The difference between them being that morality presents us with a set of rules that we can either obey or disobey; a person who is only moral is a “goody” a type that Ronnie particularly disliked. Ethics on the other hand is a way of existing, a possibility of life; so what we say or do is assessed in relation to the ways of existing involved. Thus there are things one can do or say only out of mean-spiritedness, a life based on hatred or bitterness towards life. Sometimes it takes only a gesture or word that can kill. Other styles convey a generosity of spirit. It is our style of life that makes us this or that; what we are capable of seeing or doing; and the particular morality and its interpretation that attracts us. Concepts and rules do not act alone, their rhythm and scintillation acts on us, the atmosphere in which they are grasped are vital to their meaning.

Tillich, a theologian who Ronnie knew and admired wrote: love is “the style of life that is willed in and through each of the virtues” (Tillich1959: p.144.) Each virtue derives its virtuousness from its participation in love and each is a particular mode of love. Ethics is the fundamental thinking of authentic love.

Style is a fundamental disposition. It is the way in which each of us holds his or her own prior to positive rules and laws for practical behaviour which he or she may follow. Ethics as mere
doctrine and exhortation is impotent before style which is in a fundamental relationship with Being. Style does not result in a relationship to Being, it starts from it.

A fine style comes from precise sensation and full realisation in experience. If you sense and experience things precisely you will think precisely and so have a fine style.

Style is unique, one cannot copy it. Some people would try and copy Ronnie’s style with disastrous results; he could be withering about people who did this. Style is not just ‘mental’, it is expressed and so embodied; it transcends the body-mind split; it can never be understood by a psychology that only studies the mind or by a physiology that concentrates on the body. Merely putting a hyphen between psycho-somatic is no solution unless we are clear exactly what the hyphen means. Ronnie was very attentive to people’s gestures and the extent to which they measured up to their words. I have often sat with him at a lecture when he would point out to me the dissociation between what the lecturer said and his gestures and facial expression - his style.

Style resists any ideal of correctness, it cannot be measured so it is individuating, it sets one apart from the general. It has its own necessity and cannot be adopted at will or on a whim. Style is a movement, a vital substance, not something that you can pick and choose. It is not a property of the individual, or a personal matter; it does not belong to one and so is not egoic. It is useful to recall a term from Duns Scotus haecceity which translates as ‘thisness’.

Ronnie came across this notion from reading the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins who was an admirer of Scotus (1265-1308). In The Self and Others(1961) he quotes from Hopkins:

*When I consider my self-being, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnut or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man.......Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it, except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling.......And even those things with which I in some way identify myself, as my country or family, and those things which I own and call mine, as my clothes and so on, all presuppose the strict sense of self and me and mine and are from that derivative.* (p.20)

Even in 1978 Ronnie was still reading Hopkins, especially his poem “The Windhover: To Christ Our Lord”. I quote Adrian, his son: “If Ronnie read this out once he read it a hundred times - sober, drunk, tired, exhilarated”(Laing 1994:p.198). His own poems show the influence of Hopkins.

Now Scotus’ work shows that experience is not something that a person has, or even has happen to one; it is rather what one is made of. So experience is not a property of the individual, it is not personal, it does not belong to me in the sense that my money does; thus I can loose all my money but I cannot loose my experience, although I can loose touch with my experience; a disaster Ronnie was particularly interested in. So experience is individuating and is expressed in style.
Style is a force, an anonymous affective force; this is why it is so important in psychotherapy. A vivid style is a power of demystification because it undoes the knots of dead concepts and obsessive verbalising; that is concepts and linguistic formulas that one may possess and so possess one. *Haecceity* must be understood in terms of ‘speed’, ‘feeling’ and ‘intensity’ which break up the established affective rhythm and verbalising within a teaching or learning process. Ronnie had a refined sense of the right timing to break up blocked responses to a patient - a boring case history, thoughtless repetition of psycho-analytic jargon.

A great modern stylist was Nietzsche, greatly admired by Ronnie. To quote Deleuze:

*In relation to Zarathustra, the laugh, the game, and the dance are affirmative powers of transmutation: the dance transmutes the heavy into the light, the laugh transmutes suffering into joy, the game of dice throwing transmutes the low into the high. But in relation to Dionysus, the dance, the laugh, and the game are affirmative powers of reflection and development. Dance affirms the becoming and the being of becoming; laughter affirms the multiple and the ‘one’ of the multiple; the game affirms chance and the necessity of chance.* (Deleuze 1983: p.193)

Laughter, game and music were all affirmative and transmutative powers used by Ronnie. They could reach the intensity of *haecceity* and so become independent of any affect or sentiment linked to the person, that is if the person allowed them to reach him/her. These becomings demystify representational thought such as ‘I am mad’ or ‘I am no good’, or ‘I am giving a correct case history’ - beliefs in some totalisation of the self or the other. A style, like a *haecceity*, is an *asignifying* sign, that is a sign that has become a pure event and no longer signifies anything outside of that which it is. It is not the same as a social interaction which can be represented and conceptualised, rather it is iconic; so Ronnie at times could talk about nothing yet have a forcible affect. A style and a *haecceity* is a focussed vibration, creating a resonance, an invisible force and so is not discursive, it cannot be put down in propositions which have a reference and associated states of affairs.

It is a powerful demystifying force which explodes the belief in a totalising unity which arises from preconceived representations. It challenges so as to create new forms of expression and so move away from self created knots. More important than what we think is what forces us to think. Style can trigger the metamorphosis from propositions to expressivity, to reach one’s own style, to harness one’s own forces.

Sometimes Ronnie would forget this as for example when he became fascinated with Bateson’s double bind hypothesis as an explanation for some of the manifestations of schizophrenia. This theory assumes the theory of types which depends on a view of language as a purely calculative system, the very opposite of how Ronnie understood language in his better moments. Of course few are interested now in the theory of types which has been shown to be fatally flawed and Ronnie, according to Bob Mullan’s interviews, was less enamoured of it when he was older.

*Sorcery.* *Haecceity* and events are ways of sorcery because they move one through the power of intensity rather than logical argument. Logic treats of propositions and in its modern form, symbolic logic, the judgement is dissolved into a system of mapping and interconnecting. It becomes the object of a calculus and so of a derivative structure, a concern with entities that
conceals the roots of formalised languages in natural language. A calculus is a formal system consisting of a set of specified symbols and a finite set of formation rules which regulate how the symbols are to be connected.

Ronnie was for a time rather enamoured with applying symbolic logic to human relationships as is shown in his interest in double-bind theory, dyadic relationships (Laing 1961) and Knots (1970). But he had doubts even fairly early on in its value eg. “It is doubtful if the Logical Type theory, which arises in the course of the construction of a calculus of propositions, can be applied directly to communication.” (Laing 1961:p.129) He turned more and more to what was nearer his heart—sorcery.

Sorcerers have always had an anomalous position, at the edge of the fields or the woods. They haunt the edges. They are at the border of the village, or in between two villages. The important thing is their affinity with the alliance, with the pact, which gives them a status opposite to that of filiation. The relationship with the anomalous is one of alliance. The sorcerer is in a relationship of alliance with the demon as the power of the anomalous. (Deleuze 1988: p.246)

Ronnie certainly came to inhabit an anomalous position in relation to his contemporaries. He was a famous psychiatrist and psycho-analyst but at the same time known to be involved with illicit drugs and drunkenness. He was a considered ‘expert’ on the family, on filiation, but at the same time a critic of the family and forming alliances with thinkers such as Sartre and Foucault.

He had a sensitivity to the forces of the ‘outside’ that is critical for the sorcerer; he/she must be able to harness these forces to enable the individual to ‘detterritorialise’ in Deleuze’s language. The haecceity’s combination of ‘speed’ and ‘feeling’ which can in suitable circumstances create the power to dismantle the ‘hang-ups’ preventing movement and becoming are easily avoided however. Psychotherapy now has almost completely succumbed to the ‘voices of objection’. One important means of ‘objection’ to the power of sorcery in our society is to glamorise it and I think at times Ronnie allowed this to happen. He became enamoured of sorcery, a very dangerous position as sobriety is an essential discipline for a sorcerer.

The account of sorcery amongst one of the tribes of the Jivaro Indians, the Achuar, who are headhunters of the Amazonian forest is enlightening (Descola 1996). The Achuar were aware that to openly embrace the career of a shaman exposes one to deadly danger. The murder of a sorcerer is considered legitimate by just about everybody—including his closest relatives who accept that this is more or less the destiny to be expected in this dangerous profession. They must live an ascetic existence as it is essential for them to have allies and ritual friends as they are exposed to the threat of summary execution at all times.

Contrast this with the picture of the modern therapist who is cosy and safe, caring, ‘ethical’ and professional. I think that applying any of these words to Ronnie would be problematic.

Alienation. What provokes thought are the holes and gaps in people’s lives and Ronnie had a keen nose for these in his own life and in others. In most lives there are catalepsies or a kind of sleepwalking through a number of years but somewhere there is a hole. Kierkegaard in The Sickness unto Death(1989) explored this phenomenon and Ronnie was greatly influenced by
him. He gave the book to Jock Sutherland - a leading psychoanalyst - who looked at it for an hour or so and declared that ‘it was a very interesting example of 19th century psychopathology’. Ronnie was shocked at this response of Sutherland’s as I remember him telling the story a number of times. It illustrates the huge gap in sensibility between him and most psychoanalysts.

In one of his other books Kierkegaard (1983: p.38-41) described the knight of faith. He pointed out that it is his movements that are unique for they express the sublime in the pedestrian. To look at him one would notice nothing, a bourgeois, nothing but a bourgeois. But actually he is a ‘becoming’; Kierkegaard shows that the plane of the infinite, which he calls the plane of faith, must become a pure plane of immanence that continually and immediately imparts, reimparts, and regathers the finite; a haecceity, a style. There is no longer a relation between a subject and object, but rather a movement serving as the limit of that relation, in the period associated with the subject and object.

This is not the place to go into the complexities of The Sickness unto Death. It is a phenomenological account of various types of despair-angst- based on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. For our purposes the most important form of despair is: ‘the despair which is ignorant of being despair, or the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self’. This applies roughly to the person who considers him or her self to be successful, who knows what’s what, has most things sussed out, can put people who obviously are in despair and distress in neat categories which he/she thinks defines them and distances them from their own state of successful mediocrity. It is a state of spiritual mediocrity, a state which Ronnie loathed.

But to show how The Sickness unto Death had a profound influence on Ronnie’s thought and practice I must refer to the master-slave section of Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1977: p.111-119). When we started seminars for therapists interested in phenomenology and existentialism the first seminars were given on this section of the Phenomenology of Spirit on both Ronnie’s and David Cooper’s suggestion. Why did they think this so important?

The point is that Hegel undermines the ordinary assumption that the slave is a helpless being, a victim if you like, whereas the master knows all and that the slave depends on the master for his freedom. Hegel shows that actually the master is in a blind alley and it is the slave through his/her suffering who can go on his journey to freedom. Transfer this thought to mental suffering. The patient is a slave to his/her depression, obsessions, phobias etc. The psychiatrist or psychotherapist often see themselves as in the position of the master, the one who knows, who is to free the patient from his slavery and of course the patient often sees himself as a victim depending on the psychiatrist to free him. The result is the patient becomes a slave to psychiatry or psychoanalysis.

Thinkers on the nature of human freedom from Kant via Hegel, Sartre to Laing have shown that freedom is not merely freedom from but essentially freedom to and that this requires some sort of dialectic or in more modern terms conversation to attain it. In other words neurosis and even schizophrenia, in Ronnie’s opinion, depended on some sort of decision, often in fairly early life, not to be free but rather to take up the position of a slave. This decision results in all sorts of confusions and mystifications which the therapist and patient together have to disentangle to a
greater or lesser degree before the patient can realise the untenability of his position and act in a fulfilling way.

Now this way of understanding the nature of being human is completely at odds with conventional thought in psychiatry and psychotherapy. For if freedom is dialogical it is not something that one person possesses and another does not. One cannot make people free although one can free them from something eg. if I was tied up by a rope someone might be willing to untie the rope and free me from it. Ronnie’s whole practice was deeply influenced by this insight.

If therapy and freedom are necessarily dialogical then there can be no one technique or group of techniques that are essential to help people on their way. So this distanced him from dogmatic forms of psychoanalysis and nearly all the 400 or so psychotherapies. Let me give an example. 20 or so years ago I was consulted by the parents of a man who had had a lot of psychiatric treatment and had been advised to have a leucotomy; they wanted a second opinion. I saw him and couldn’t make head or tale of much of what he said except that it was clear he was intelligent, was a devout Muslim, and I thought he was referring to certain Sufi experiences that I was familiar with. I was sure I could not take him on for treatment. I asked Ronnie what I should do. He thought a bit and said he had a friend who knew a lot about Sufi communities. So in the end we arranged for him to go to Egypt to join a suitable Sufi community. 2 years or so later I got a letter from him thanking me and saying he was now much clearer about his life and had entered training to become a dervish.

Ronnie’s scepticism about particular techniques in psychotherapy was many years ahead of his time and of course was bitterly attacked. In the last 20 years or so there has been a vast amount of research backing up his position. Briefly what has been found is that it is the credibility (the style?) of the therapist to the patient that is important not the theories and techniques that the therapist believes in (Christensen & Jacobson 1994). For example if you match phobic patients sending one lot to a trained psychoanalyst who sees them 4* weekly and a matched lot to an intelligent counsellor or a cognitive therapist then there is no difference in the cure rate; the counsellor may have no theory whatsoever about phobias but will get just as good results as the psychoanalyst who has highly elaborate theories about phobia. This applies to depression, obsessions and other neuroses.

Worse still for traditional psychoanalytic therapy it has been found that supportive therapy produces just as much structural change as non-supportive therapy, so giving the lie to the belief that only psychoanalytic therapy produces real change and other therapies are only suggestive. Furthermore in psychoanalysis itself it was found that structural change occurred as much with non-interpretive supportive means as with interpretations. For a general review (Erwin 1997)

These observations were done by hard-nosed clinicians and statisticians not by crazy existentialists, but actually confirm what existentialists have been saying for years.

As Freida Fromm-Reichmann, who Ronnie greatly admired, said: ‘The patient needs an experience, not an explanation’. This is conveyed by style and sorcery rather than treatments that are the application of some theory.
Another aspect of Ronnie’s dialogical approach was his way of sharing his cultural sensibilities with his patients. For example the residents of P.A. houses would often be interested in phenomenology and existentialism, they would be part of the general enterprise of studying what it is to be human instead of being treated as victims who are having ‘good’ done to them. The central question ‘What is good’ would be kept open instead of being decided by a group of self-styled experts and then being applied to people - passive victims of power hungry knowledge.

Ronnie had a deep understanding that human communication involves not merely the movement of the message from sender position to receiver position but that one has already to be in communication with the person to be addressed before one starts speaking. That is why conversational discourse involves paralinguistic elements designed to create interaction and integration.

Transgression. I now want to change the subject and discuss the influence of Nietzsche and Foucault on Ronnie. Nietzsche receives more mention than any other philosopher in Mad to be Normal(1995). I remember him reading extracts from Nietzsche- quite an experience as Nietzsche is very quotable and Ronnie was magnificent at reading aloud. Ronnie was ahead of his time for in the 1960's Nietzsche was not much read in England. Now he is one of the most widely read and discussed philosopher. It was Nietzsche’s critique of our culture and his style of writing that were important to him. Nietzsche realised you cannot separate man’s ‘mind’ from his culture and so alienation from the culture in which he is alienated. Is it the man or the culture that is alienated?

And of course Nietzsche was the most important influence on Foucault and Ronnie published four of Foucault’s books in his World of Man Series.

There are many influences running between these three thinkers. I want to discuss their interest in transgression. Foucault’s fine essay: A Preface to Transgression(Foucault 1977 p.29-52) is a good introduction to his thinking on this. Much of Nietzsche’s writing shows his interest in transgression. The reason why it is so important to psychiatry is that psychiatrists see people who have transgressed in one way or another and have to take into account its anomalous position. For transgression can be creative or destructive and the unanswerable question is what makes it sometimes one and sometimes the other; that is a question that Nietzsche, Foucault, and Laing were interested in.

Take art for example. Nearly all great art transgresses rules but not every transgression of rules is great art. If I sent a chamber pot to an exhibition of art I doubt if any one would be impressed but when Duchamp did in the 1920’s it was highly significant. Great moral thinkers like Buddha, Jesus Christ, Socrates, were thought of by most of their contemporaries as exceptionally wicked transgressors of the law as was Freud in his time. Socrates was considered a pervert r of the young, presumably nowadays he would be fitted with an electronic device telling the powers that be where he is - such is progress! Lister was thought mad or bad when he suggested that midwives should wash their hands before examining a woman in labour.
Take madness and loss of reason for example. What is reason? Rarely do psychiatrists or therapists question it, they assume of course that they are reasonable and anyone who deviates much from them is unreasonable or perhaps ‘lost’ it. But what is ‘it’?

Ronnie was very surprised at the vehemence of the reaction to his questioning of madness. Many people have questioned the notion eg Plato in the Phaedrus. That pillar of the establishment Samuel Johnson said of Christopher Smart - the mad poet: “I do not think he ought to be shut up. His infirmities were not noxious to society. He insisted on people praying with him; and I’d as lief pray with Kit Smart as any one else .Another charge was, that he did not love clean linen; and I have no passion for it”. (Boswell Vol.1: p.263-4)

Ronnie refused to be a servant of the state and have to treat people as the state ordered so he left the NHS and tried to help people according to their and his best judgement - in a dialogue with them. He knew that a professional person in the old sense of the word could give judgements that were against the majority opinion and the government, as lawyers do to this day. It is ironical that therapists now go cap in hand to the government in order to get recognition as a profession; the direct opposite of how professions were originally formed and also of the origins of psychoanalysis. Imagine the response of the British government in the 1920's if Ernest Jones had gone ,cap in hand, to ask them to legitimise psychoanalysis! Yet this is what the ‘profession’ is doing now. Questions of sanity and madness and their treatment are subtle and controversial questions and it is doubtful if a government official is the best person to judge who are the best people to deal with it.

A reading of Nietzsche and Foucault would also show why neither Ronnie or Foucault were keen on embracing anti-psychiatry. They both knew and argued that things are much more complicated than taking up a pro or anti position in these matters; Ronnie like Foucault was a dialectical thinker. In Mad to be Normal (Mullan 1995) he talks sympathetically of ECT, saying he could well understand some people wanting it; it is the casual use of it and forcing people to have it who do not want it that he objected to. He certainly did not think that psychotherapy or psychoanalysis were the sole answer to mental pain and despair.

Way of Being Nietzsche and Foucault were both very aware of the complexities and subtleties of language and that the play of negativity, what can be said and what cannot be said but only shown, are crucial. Ronnie too was in that tradition, that is why he so liked Dionysius’ works, the tradition of negative theology, Zen Buddhism, Beckett and so on. If one had no sense of irony then I think Ronnie would be very difficult to understand - a complaint he made about Americans and humanistic psychologists, perhaps a little unfairly.

In teaching he was fond of Confusius’ saying ‘I show them one corner’. I once told him the Zen story of the mayor of a district who visited a Zen master. He went into the room and the master drew a circle in the air. The mayor said: ‘Wait a minute, I haven’t even sat down yet’. The master shut the door, which means he accepted him as a genuine pupil. The ordinary person would have tried to work out what the circle meant and so got endlessly mystified! The mayor on the other hand, was ontologically secure. Ronnie liked the story.
He was an admirer of Thomas Reid, the great Scottish philosopher of common sense; it was he thought: ‘a refined, cultivated common sense; an attempt to steer a way out of solipsism or, on the other hand, crude materialism’ (Mullan 1995:p.310). Note the profundity of that remark. The field of ‘mental health’ is completely bedevilled by this dichotomy. On one side there are most psychoanalysts and therapists who are idealists and solipsistic although they may not be aware that this is where their theories led. To give one example, Freud assumed that consciousness only makes us aware of our own states of mind, that other people possess a consciousness is an inference only (Freud 1984: p.170); this assumption leads straight to solipsism or idealism. On the other side there are most psychiatrists who think that chemistry eventually will solve human despair.

Ronnie had a great ability to see his way through the maze of nonsense that issues from the mouths of therapists and students. He could be rather savage at times however. He called himself ‘a provisional sceptic’(Mullan 1995:p.310)and was close to the Greek Pyrrhonian sceptics (Heaton 1993). He had no use for any ism that closes off into dogmatism and exclusivity. ‘The world within us and outside us is beyond us, in both directions’ (Mullan 1995:p.313).

I should mention here Ronnie’s interest in neuro-psychiatry and those great pioneers like Schilder, Goldstein, Strauss all German Jews who had read Heidegger and Freud and of course were familiar with neuro-psychiatry. They all had to flee Germany when Hitler came to power and so their influence became lost. I was interested in the visual agnosias and to understand them had read Goldstein and Strauss, this common interest was one of my first links with Ronnie. Both of us agreed that one can never understand the ‘mind’ without taking into account the changes that occur with brain injury; psychoanalytic theories of the mind entirely neglect this. Oliver Sacks of course is pursuing this field and refers to the authors I have mentioned. But note the care and modesty of his writing compared with that of most therapists. The basic idea we got from Strauss and others was to walk and talk with these patients and note how they managed instead of merely submitting them to a battery of psychological tests.

Ronnie was a master of the unspoken. He was attentive to that in language that exceeds the order of signification. For example in the early sixties LSD was being used in the clinic I was working in. I said to Ronnie I would like to use it. He said the responsible thing would be for me to take it first and that he would accompany me on the first trip. So on a Saturday afternoon he gave it to me sitting opposite. After an hour or so I began to feel depersonalised and began to murmur was I real, was he real etc. Ronnie said no word but began to slowly and deliberately light his pipe. I watched fascinated and then suddenly everything somehow clicked into place and the rest of the trip was enjoyable. I talked to him later about it and he said how important Heidegger’s point about zuhandenheit- handiness versus vorhandenheit- objective presence, was (Heidegger 1962:p.91-107); we are in the world with things ready to hand long before any conceptual language develops; it is attention to zuhandenheit that is so important in ‘trips’ and with psychotic people. I have found in treating many psychotic people that this is the best advice I have ever received on this topic.

It was not only the use of family therapy but attention to that which exceeds signification that marked our treatment of psychosis from that of Kleinians like Rosenfeld who were treating
psychotic people. To Klein and Rosenfeld everything must be explainable in their theoretical terms. Ronnie on the other hand was concerned with how language reveals and conceals. Language comes to the word in logos and holds thought in its grip, but it does not speak its essence in that word. Ronnie’s love of poetry and his belief in its importance to psychotherapy was connected with this insight. As he once remarked to me he could not imagine a person with less sense of the poetry of life than Klein.

The vital importance of the poetics of experience, the volatility of our being with, its intangibility, especially evident in the person to person encounter, were central to Ronnie’s thinking. He realised that the essential meaning of lived experience cannot be captured by assertions and so put into a theory; it is attuned understanding that he sought to develop. This is of course a very Nietzschean theme. I should mention Nietzsche’s linking of music and philosophy and Ronnie would often break up philosophical discussions by playing the piano. He would have agreed with Plato who wrote that: ‘The supreme music is philosophy’.

Conclusion. I think Ronnie was a close student of the poetry of experience and its relevance to psychiatry. He was especially interested in transgression, its nature and its limits; of the relationship between reason and loss of reason, madness and sanity, what is right and what is wrong, what can be said and what cannot be said, of mind and body. He tried to teach that it is these matters that should be of central concern to psychiatry.

References


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